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ABSTRACT: The article suggests that the gender politics advanced by the young female members of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the family sphere after the 2013 military-led coup challenges the 
movement’s ability to re-emerge from repression based on traditional patriarchal values and principles. A 
patriarchal division of labour, epitomized in women’s position in the family, sustains the Brotherhood in times 
of repression and in its absence. The research shows that the circumstances of repression against the 
movement have caused women to reconsider the Brotherhood’s patriarchal structures, with potential 
consequences for the organisation. The article does so by analysing women’s articulations of their role in the 
family and in marriage relationships. Using love as an analytical lens, the article argues that women’s 
demand for love in marriage suggest their desire to commit the Brotherhood to attending women’s needs, 
desires and aspirations.  
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Women are central to Islamist movements, their operations and running, as well as to their ability to 
survive repression. In Islamist movements, women take care of the upbringing of new generations of 
activists (Cook 2001, 90), perform da‘wa (preaching) among other women and their communities (Clark 
2004b; Mahmood 2012), thus helping Islamists to propagate their message and ideology. Additionally, 
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women are a significant number of the activists that sustain Islamists’ networks of social and religious 
associations (Clark 2004a; Wickham 2004). Their role is not confined to social and religious activism but 
also includes politics. Although women are seldom included in the leadership offices of Islamist 
organisations, they play an important role as voters and recruiters of votes for Islamists in times of elections 
(Blaydes and El-Tarouty 2009; Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2012; Biagini 2020a). Notably, women’s activism is 
essential to Islamist movements’ survival under repression. Karam (1998) narrates at length of how it was 
the women who sustained the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (henceforth Brotherhood) during President 
Gamal Abdul Nasser’s crackdown against the movement in the 1950s and 1960s, by looking after the 
prisoners and their families. Likewise, Zollner (2007) recounts of how Zeinab al-Ghazali, a prominent 
Sisterhood leader, contributed to the Brotherhood’s ideological renewal during repression by smuggling 
Sayyid Qutb’s political writing outside prison until her arrest in 1965.  
Brotherhood female members, grouped in the all-female wing of the Muslim Sisterhood (henceforth 
Sisterhood or Sisters), have been playing a similar role since former general and current President Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi led a coup against the movement on 3 July 2013, ousting elected President Mohamed Morsi, a 
Brotherhood member, and instigating a new wave of repression against Islamists. Since then, the Sisterhood 
and their activism have been indispensable to the Brotherhood’s survival. After the coup, the Sisters 
sustained Islamists’ mobilisation by leading and participating in protest activities, took care of the 
Brotherhood prisoners and their families, raised awareness about the regime-led human rights abuses against 
Islamists via local and international organisations, led hunger strike campaigns in support of the prisoners, 
set up and coordinated networks of Brotherhood lawyers to follow up the prisoners’ legal cases, provided 
support to the victims of regime violence, raised funds for the movement and looked after the upbringing of 
Brotherhood children (Biagini 2017). Therefore, to this day, the Sisterhood’s activism remains essential not 
only to the Brotherhood’s ability to endure the current crackdown under al-Sisi but also to re-emerge from it 
in the future.  
The crucial, albeit often invisible and of background, role that women play in Islamist movements reflects 
a patriarchal division of labour, which demands women to support the movement and its reproduction so that 
men can practice politics and risk repression. However, the Sisters’ activism after the 2013 Brotherhood 
ousting indicates that women’s experience of repression has caused some of them to reconsider the 
movement’s patriarchal gender regime. This is particularly relevant among young female members who have 
since 2011 advocated for greater emancipation and power-sharing in the Brotherhood, and raised claims 
centred on bodily integrity and autonomy (Biagini and Rivetti 2020; Biagini 2020b). After 2013, in the 
absence of the male leadership - either arrested, killed or in exile - and the associated weakening of the 
Brotherhood’s organisation due to repression, disenchanted members, including women, took advantage of 
new spaces to implement initiatives aimed at advancing gender reforms and to play roles previously denied 
to them under the Brotherhood (Ardovini 2020; Biagini 2017, 2020b). This renewed entrepreneurial spirit, 
evinced in women’s activism and demands for greater autonomy, challenges the Brotherhood’s patriarchal 
regime and division of labour, creating opportunities for gender change in the movement.  
Specifically, this article looks at how the circumstances of repression caused the Sisters to reconsider 
gender relations within the family and marriage, and interrogates the effect that this might have on the 
Brotherhood’s organization. Relying on interviews with Sisterhood members in Egypt after 2013, the article 
examines women’s articulations concerning their role within the family and marriage. Using love as an 
analytical lens, the article argues that women’s demand for love within the realm of marriage suggests their 
desire to commit the Brotherhood to attending women’s needs, desires and aspirations. Looking at how 
women’s activism within the family affects the Brotherhood’s organisation makes a unique contribution to 








patriarchal culture, no attention has been given to how changes in gender relations within the family may 
affect the movement as the organisational level.  
 
2. Islamist Movements, Women’s Reproductive Work and Love 
 
Women’s identity as mothers is central to conceptualisations of gender in Islamist movements, causing 
Islamists to embrace heteropatriarchy as the dominant gender regime and ideology (Saktanber 2002; 
Mahmood 2012; Ozyegin 2015; McLarney 2015). Islamists subscribe to a complementarian gender 
worldview that attributes men and women different roles in a male-headed family (Badran 2011, 332). These 
roles are ascribed to men and women based on a normative model of selfless femininity and protective 
masculinity (Ozyegin 2015, 3), reflecting what Islamists believe to be innate characteristics of the two sexes. 
Within this model, women are understood primarily as mothers because of their reproductive capacities, and 
are believed to have innate qualities such as selflessness, nurturing and caring, which make them naturally 
inclined to play a caregiving role in their families and communities, and provide comfort to their husbands. 
As Saktanber notes, “In so far as women [are] thought of as having been created with the innate qualities of 
motherly mercy and affection, they [are] also expected to give rest and comfort to men, who in return [are] 
expected to take care of women” (cited in Ozyegin 2015, 222). By contrast, masculinity constructions 
demand men to play a main role as providers and protectors of women and their families. 
Islamists’ heteronormative femininity and masculinity constructions free men from reproductive and 
caregiving responsibilities, thus allowing them to perform politics and risk repression insofar as women are 
those taking care of sustaining and reproducing the movement. Starting within the family, women undertake 
all the necessary house chores such as cooking, cleaning, schooling the children, and so forth. Women are 
also the ones bearing and nurturing children, thus ensuring the reproduction of Islamist movements’ new 
generations of activists. Hamdan (2019) makes a similar observation about the Palestinian resistance 
movement, asserting that women’s role in the family ensures the movement’s “biopolitical” resistance, 
guaranteeing its organic and ideological reproduction.  
Islamist movements’ patriarchal division of labour does not preclude women from entering the public 
sphere to pursue education, work or politics. However, it politicises these women’s endeavours as an 
expression of motherhood, subordinating their undertakings to this primary identity. Accordingly, women’s 
education is promoted as necessary to develop better mothers so that they can raise better children in turn, 
while women’s entrance into the public sphere of politics is pursued with a view at promoting the protection 
of the patriarchal family and women’s primary role in it (Karam 1998; Baron 2005; Badran 2011). Women 
can work outside the home, but only if necessary and insofar as it does not compromise women’s ability to 
fulfil their family duties. Importantly, Islamists set rules around what are considered appropriate women’s 
occupations, channelling women towards sectors such as education and nursing, for instance, believed to fit 
best women’s innate nurturing and caregiving qualities (Inge 2017, 168; see also Hochschild 1983).  
Two important points follows. First, given the centrality of motherhood to Islamist movements and their 
identity politics, women are asked to subordinate their needs, desires and aspirations to the role, spaces and 
positions that Islamists ascribe to women (see also Vickers 2006). Second, Islamists’ feminine constructions 
set expectations for women to undertake reproductive work for the movement without having the prospect to 
be compensated for it in return. That is, by ascribing nurturing and caregiving as innate women’s qualities, 
Islamists not only understand reproduction as a “work that women have always done” (Hochschild 1983, 
171), but also recognise this as women’s free labour and moralise it as their outmost expression of love 








“potential rebellion against the sense of suffered injustice” (Federici 2011, 69) and to detract men the duty to 
reciprocate or reward women for it. 
Feminist scholars and historians have interrogated at length when and how women’s work in the family 
became devalued when compared to the work that men undertake outside of it (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; 
Federici 2004, 2011; Smith 2020). Federici (2004) demonstrates that harnessing women’s socially 
reproductive labour and controlling women’s entrance into the labour force, while creating clear 
demarcations between productive and reproductive work, was essential to the development of a capitalist 
society that relied on the supply of a workforce produced and reproduced by women in the family, to fill the 
ranks of the expanding industry. From this, women’s work was understood as reproductive and thus as non-
remunerated, in contrast to that of men, which was associated with productive industrial work, and thus as 
remunerated. As Smith (2020) shows, during the same period women’s reproductive family work became 
moralised as the outmost expression of their love. This was necessary to create a new moral order able to 
regulate women’s sexuality and harness their labour to the family amid growing values such as individualism 
and autonomy. Consequently, the institution of marriage projected a connection between “body and soul and, 
hence, between sex and love”, thus serving the “dual purpose of procreation and companionship” (50). 
Under the new model of marriage as a love relationship, men’s power and authority in marriage were not 
undermined; rather, they were “further legitimated ... since wifely obedience was now a ‘choice,’ indeed an 
expression of love” (Ibid).   
To emphasise the centrality of women’s reproductive work to a patriarchal division of labour and how this 
is not only normalised as essentially feminine, and therefore free, but also moralised as women’s outmost 
expression of love, allows doing two important things in this study. First, it allows understanding why 
women’s emancipatory demands that would take them away from the family sphere encounter severe 
resistance by Islamists. At the very least, women’s moving away from the family would demand men to 
share in reproductive work or to devise alternative ways to compensate for the work women no longer 
undertake in that sphere. Also, it may compromise Islamist movements’ secure and free reproduction, with 
consequences for their ability to thrive and resist repression. Second, it allows understanding how women’s 
demand for love can be interpreted as suggesting their desire to shift the direction of commitment from the 
movement to the women. A feminist approach to love emphasises the relationship that exists between love 
and power. Within this approach, love is more than a feeling, because it is interwoven in the activities and 
interactions in which the members of the relationship participate (Thagaard 1997, 358). In egalitarian 
relationships, partners do not understand love as free, but as something extra, a gift, that they bring to the 
relationship, and to which the other partner should respond with gratitude and reciprocity (Horchschild 
1989). Because the family work that women undertake and sustain Islamist movements is promoted as their 
outmost expression of love, this may create expectations among women to be reciprocated. To this day, 
however, women have been mainly on the giving end of love, channelling their energy in the service of the 
movement and its goals, while receiving little in return. Therefore, women’s demands for love in the family 
sphere and marriage may suggest their desire to be on the receiving end of Islamist movements’ love.  
Investigating the role that emotions play in Islamist movements is important also in light of recent 
research. Following the cultural turn in social movement theory since the 1990s, Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) scholars have advanced novel understandings of how emotions work alongside strategic, 
material and individuals’ motivations for mobilisation (among others see Perlman 2013; Jumet 2017; 
Wedeen 2018, Rivetti 2020; Chamas in this Special Issue). This scholarship has challenged pejorative 
connotations associated to the role of emotion in collective action, which connected emotions with notions of 
“crowd feelings” and irrationality, contributing instead to an understanding of how emotions shape processes 








Investigations into the role that emotions played in the events of the 2010-2011 uprisings show that they 
were important to foster activists’ mobilisation against authoritarian regimes when rational calculations 
would have suggested activists not to mobilise (Perlman 2013), and also why many ordinary Egyptians 
citizens refrained from taking action during the same period (Jumet 2017). Importantly, inquiries into the 
role of emotions are also revealing of how political change is sustained under authoritarian strengthening and 
apparent demobilisation. In particular, Allam’s (2018) research on Egypt’s women’s movement demonstrates 
that activists responded to the disappointment that followed the re-establishment of a military regime by 
engaging in alternative forms of expression to promote gender change, such as art, for instance. Similarly, 
Matthies-Boon’s (2017) work on trauma among Egypt’s post-revolutionary youth shows that focussing on 
personal lives became an important coping mechanism for activists to give meaning to past experiences and 
endured sacrifices.  
Inquiries into the role of emotions in Islamist movements also show that emotions are important to 
Islamists’ processes of recruitment and mobilisation (Pahwa 2019), and to forming the collective identity that 
sustains their unity and resistance under repression (Al-Anani 2016). Regarding the specific emotion of love, 
nurturing love for God and for the community is a main endeavour that Islamists undertake to cultivate 
members’ commitment towards the movement and its goals (Kandil 2015, 12). This is true to such an extent 
that disengaging from Islamist groups also becomes an intense, and at times traumatic, experience for 
members, as their material, kinship and emotional worlds break down in the process (Vannetzel 2014; 
Menshawy 2020; Ardovini 2020). However, research into the role that emotions play among women in 
Islamist movements remains scant, despite women’s work and gender roles being particularly loaded with 
emotional expectations (Hurwitz and Taylor 2012).  
Therefore, how can we interpret Islamist women’s demands for love in the sphere of marriage, when 
Islamist movements expect women to be the primary givers of care and love to their families and 
communities? And what would mean for Islamist movements and their organisations, were they to commit to 
women’s demands for love? These are the main questions this article addresses. Social movement scholars 
agree that insofar as women are those undertaking the larger share of emotional work, their “expression of 
‘outlaw emotions’ can become the basis for powerful political challenges” (Goodwin et al. 2004: 9). What is 
less clear is how women’s emotions interact “with organizational and strategic dynamics” (Ibid). Research 
shows that love can contribute to shifting members’ commitment towards a movement by altering the 
salience of personal identities and preferences (Kim 2002). However, among all emotions, love remains the 
most ambivalent (Ibid.), meaning that love can be appropriated by members to resignify their relationship 
with their movements.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, it presents data and methods. Second, it illustrates the gendered 
character of the Brotherhood’s collective identity, to show that women’s abidance to heterosexual and 
patriarchal femininity constructions equates to their commitment to the movement and its goals. The ensuing 
section brings attention to the critique that women have advanced against the Brotherhood’s gender regime 
following the movement’s efforts to bring women back into the family after repression, a period when 
women enjoyed greater opportunities to expand their activism and roles to new areas. The last section 
presents an analysis of women’s demands for love in marriage relationships. The results show that women’s 
demands for love from their husbands reveal their desire to make their husbands equally invested in 
attending women’s needs, desires and aspirations, so that women can be selves outside being mothers and 
wives. This has implications for the Brotherhood as a movement for the very nature of gender being a 
relational category. For women to inhabit the identities they have created for themselves, the heterosexual 








also has to commit to attending to women’s needs, desires and aspirations. The conclusion summarises the 
main findings.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
Data for this article include 55 semi-structured interviews conducted face-to-face with 35 Sisterhood 
activists in Cairo, Egypt, between 2013 and 2018. During this time, I grew close to a number of Sisterhood 
activists, a privilege that allowed me to interview some of the women multiple times and observe how their 
activism and personal lives changed with changing political circumstances in Egypt. All of the interviewees 
were Sisterhood members; they were either born into Brotherhood families (n. 26) or had joined the 
movement prior to Egypt’s 2011 uprising (n. 9). They were aged between 19 and 65 years old, with the 
largest majority (n. 25) being in their twenties and thirties. Therefore, while I ensured to diversify among 
participants to include middle-generation and senior Sisters, the article relies heavily on the views of young 
Sisterhood members, whose voices, like those of Egypt’s youth (Matthies-Boon 2017; El-Tohamy 2016), 
were significantly marginalised after the uprisings. Their voices are important to acknowledge because they 
represent those of the future generations of female Brotherhood activists and leaders.  
Field research began in 2013, coinciding with the beginning of the Brotherhood’s repression. This 
complicated issues of access to the participants and influenced the biographies of the women I was able to 
interview. Access to the Sisters was gained with the support of liberal-secular activists sympathetic to the 
Brotherhood. As it happen with closed groups, after gaining access it was the Sisters who took care of 
introducing me to other members. Because of this, many of the Sisters interviewed belonged to the same 
Cairo district. This was one of the largest districts in Cairo, with a conspicuous Brotherhood presence, 
including that of its student movement. As fieldwork progressed, I also interviewed Sisters active in the 
broader Cairo area, including members who had relocated to the capital from the governorates of Dakahlia, 
Port Said and Soagh, upon beginning college. Interviews took place in the Sisters’ houses and, occasionally, 
at Sisterhood meetings and political gatherings.  
Class was an important Sisterhood’s characteristic. All of the Sisters interviewed were highly educated, 
held college degrees or were in the process of obtaining one; some held a master degree or a doctorate. 
Women’s middle-class status was often reflected in their motivation to play a greater role in the Brotherhood 
and society. In terms of women’s position in the Brotherhood, the young Sisters held no leadership posts in 
the movement’s political and administrative offices. The Brotherhood is a hierarchical and gerontocratic 
organisation, assigning posts of leadership and authority to members based on their seniority and 
demonstrated loyalty to the movement, its leaders and principles (Al-Anani 2016). Furthermore, the 
Brotherhood has kept the Sisterhood into a separate division from the organisation since the Nasser’s 
repression to keep women out of harm’s way (Abdellatif 2008). Consequently, while the Sisters may hold 
leadership posts, these are usually reserved to senior Sisters who exercise their leadership upon other women 
in women-only spaces (Biagini 2020a). Among the middle-generation Sisters interviewed, one was a district 
coordinator holding a considerable degree of influence over the female members of the Brotherhood’s 
student movement in the Cairo district where many of my interviewees were active; one had held a post as 
the head of the Women’s Section of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in 2011-2013, the Brotherhood-led 
party, in another large district of Cairo with conspicuous Brotherhood presence; one senior Sister was highly 
influential in the Brotherhood due to her being a prominent human rights lawyer and her marriage to a senior 
Brotherhood member, also a human rights lawyer.  
All of the women had been politically active since Egypt’s 2011 uprisings. Most of the young members 








the Egyptian movement in support of Palestine, the one against the Iraq war, the student-led movement for 
universities’ independence and Kefaya (see also El-Tohamy 2016). They were all present in the Rabaa al-
Adawiyya sit-in and during its dispersal, playing roles as journalists, as organisers and collectors of 
information, and assisting in field hospitals. After the 2013 repression, all of the interviewees (but one 
because of age and health reasons) had mobilised as part of the Islamists’ resistance, taking part in street 
protests, local committees and as members of the Women Against the Coup, an umbrella movement led by 
the Sisters, comprising diverse Sisterhood-led sub-groups. Some of the youth members interviewed had 
played a role as members and leaders of the Sisterhood youth-led Ultras Banat and Bint al-Thawra 
movements (see Biagini 2017, 2020b).  
Despite the Sisters interviewed share an experience of activism, the article does not claim that they also 
collectively mobilised in the family sphere demanding love after 2015. Individuals follow diverse trajectories 
of activism, despite their past attitudes and behaviours often influence their choices (Fillieule 2010). The 
Sisters have demonstrated creativity in finding new ways to remain active amid repression, seeking 
alternative spaces and modes of expression to bring forward demands for gender reforms and emancipation 
that emerged during Egypt’s uprising. Under repression, the family and marriage relationships became 
important venues for the young Sisters in particular, to bring forward those gender reforms they had 
advocated for since the uprisings. All of the names reported herein are pseudonyms.  
 
4. The Brotherhood, Women and Organisational Identity 
 
Hassan Al-Banna established the Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt with the goal of reviving Islam in society 
and resist Western colonialism. He advanced a religious inspired nationalist model whose focal point for 
reforming the moral, cultural, political, economic and legal character of society was resolutely anchored in 
Islam. Al-Banna’s message was appealing because it identified the source of power to rectify Egypt’s socio-
political weakness in individuals’ personal change rather than in material conditions. For him, it was the 
“moral character of men rather than the impact of structural forces which determined the evolution of 
history” (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995, 88). His model was also promising because the tools to change 
society were readily available and resided in individuals’ resolve and dedication (Ibid.). Consequently, Al-
Banna made of cultivating good Muslim individuals the Brotherhood’s first step and ultimate goal to regain 
the glory of an Islamic nation.  
Love plays a central role in the Brotherhood because it sustains members’ unity and provides the basis for 
their commitment to the Islamic project. In Al-Banna’s view, “religion was all what was necessary to create 
individuals’ bonds of love and loyalty to the nation” (Ibidem, 82). Accordingly, awakening Islam in 
individuals was an affair of the spirit for Al-Banna. As he wrote, the Brotherhood’s “primary concern is to 
arouse the spirit, the life of the heart, to awaken the imagination and sentiments. We place less emphasis on 
concrete ideas ... than on touching the souls of those who we encounter” (Al-Banna cited in Kandil 2015, 
10).  
Love for fellow Muslims and for God is instilled in members through means of tarbiyya (education). For a 
long time, scholars dismissed tarbiyya as simple religious indoctrination. However, as documented by 
Kandil (2015, 6), tarbiyya is an elaborate activity the end goal of which “is not to win over more believers, 
but to produce a new kind of person: the Muslim Brother.” Tarbiyya takes place in small units of members 
called families (s. usra; pl. usar). The name choice is not accidental. The reference to the biological family 
indicates the strength of bond and commitment that members are encouraged to pursue.  
While most of the inner values that the Brotherhood instils in members apply equally to men and women, 








among members according to their gender. This results in the creation of specific femininities and 
masculinities that form the basis of the Brotherhood’s collective identity. This is evinced in the content that 
the Brotherhood’s tarbiyya curricula for men and women address. The curricula are drafted centrally by the 
Brotherhood and imparted to all members; therefore, they are important to instil in members the movements’ 
norms and values. Up to 2013, Brotherhood’s curricula for women focused on religious scriptures and 
chapters of the Qur’an (s. sūrah) whose content addressed primarily women, their position in the family, and 
showcased the husband’s and wife’s rights and duties in marriage, such as sūrah al-Nisā’ (The Women). In 
contrast, men’s curricula focused on religious scriptures containing jihad (resistance), such as sūrah al-Anfāl 
(The Bounties [of War]) and sūrah al-’An‘ām (The Grazing Livestock), to reflect the roles men play in 
society.1 Consequently, women’s curricula encouraged them to cultivate feminine qualities such as modesty, 
shyness, softness and selfless sacrifice for the family. In contrast, men curricula prepared them for a future 
life of repression. The Brotherhood’s feminine construction is not unique to the movement, but resembles 
those adopted by other piety movements across the MENA region (Ozyegin 2015; Mahmood 2012; Joseph 
1994), and also serves Islamists’ patriarchal division of labour.  
By virtue of their central position in the family, women play a key role in the Brotherhood’s project of 
establishing an Islamic society. Women are the main biological and cultural reproducers of the ideal Islamic 
community the Brotherhood ought to establish, and thus they are the depositaries and the transmitters of the 
group’s identity (Yuval-Davis 2008; McClintock 1993). Al-Banna clarified women’s centrality to the 
movement and its goals in a letter titled “The Muslim Woman” (Al-Mara’a al-Muslima), in 1936, in which 
he stated that “women are half of the society”, and indeed “the half who exerts the strongest influence on 
society, because they are the first educators of the new generations” (Badie 2011, 281). The Brotherhood 
believes that a patriarchal family is central to Islam, and thus to an Islamic society. This patriarchal family 
places men in a position of guardianship over women, consequently sanctioning men’s leadership and 
control over women and the family, while demanding women’s obedience to their husbands in return. A 
man’s position of leadership in the family and a woman’s duty to abide to his orders are epitomised in a 
sentence often cited by Sisterhood members stating that “a ship with two captains will sink,” meaning that if 
both men and women were to play an equal role in the family, this will be marred by conflict.  
Women are demanded to comply with the Brotherhood set standards of femininity also at the organisation 
level. The Brotherhood’s hierarchical organisation is structured to promote the movement’s collective 
identity. It does so by binding members’ advancement into its ranks based on their seniority and their 
abidance to the Brotherhood’s ideology, norms, values, and codes of identity (Al-Anani 2016, 3). According 
to Al-Anani (2016, 4-5), the Brotherhood’s identity does not prevent members from having other social 
roles, because one can be a Brother and also a father or a teacher, for instance. However, the gender 
dimension of the Brotherhood’s identity remains overlooked in Al-Anani’s work. While true that members 
can have other social roles, these are influenced by the gender of members. The Brotherhood channels 
women into roles that it perceives more adept for women. These are supportive roles to the movement and 
exclude leadership roles. The Brotherhood also demands women to abide to specific feminine qualities to be 
accepted as members, meaning that while one can be a Sister and a mother, a teacher and even a member of 
parliament, only those mothers, teachers and female politicians who embody the value system and feminine 
qualities that the Brotherhood ascribes to women are believed to be worthy of membership and leadership in 
the organisation. These values include women’s commitment to motherhood as their primary role, their 
abidance to a patriarchal family structure, the husband’s orders and that of the movement, piety and modesty, 
 








among others. Indeed, the Brotherhood rewards compliant women with political participation and leadership 
(Biagini 2020a), while it marginalises those who do not (Biagini 2020b). 
Therefore, motherhood epitomises the Brotherhood’s identity politics, and women’s abidance to this 
role, along with to the Brotherhood’s set femininity standards, a patriarchal family and a clear-cut division of 
labour, equates to women’s commitment to the movement and its political project. Indeed, the Brotherhood, 
its organisation and activism, rest on a strict patriarchal division of labour, which attributes women a primary 
role within the family, sanction their abidance to the orders of their husbands and the movement, and 
demands of them auxiliary roles in both times of repression and its absence. These gendered arrangements 
demand women to give more love than they receive. Women are expected to supply the movement with 
emotional and reproductive labour without which the movement could not sustain itself, while giving up on 
personal desires and ambitions that do not match the movement’s goals, and without having to expect 
anything in return. 
In the current period of demobilisation, the Brotherhood is focusing on re-building the movement. 
Under these circumstances, its ability to survive prolonged repression rests equally on its capacity to sustain 
its networks, keep resources flowing and cultivating new generations of committed members. With many of 
the male members imprisoned and in exile, these tasks have fallen to a significant extent upon women and 
the networks they sustain. However, it is precisely at this time in which women and their family work has 
acquired even greater centrality for the movement and its survival, that women are advancing claims to 
expand their freedoms and autonomy within that sphere. As field research reveals, some Sisters have been 
questioning the Brotherhood’s patriarchal structures along with men’s position of privilege in the family. 
They have been demanding love from their husbands, suggesting women’s desire to commit their husbands 
and the movement to women’s needs, desires and aspirations, even when these contravene the Brotherhood’s 
gender code and division of labour. 
 
5. Sisters, Brothers and the family post-2013 
 
Women’s demands for greater emancipation in the Brotherhood emerged in the 1990s (El-Ghobashy 
2005) but the movement never fully met them. Egypt’s 2011 uprising renewed members’ desire for change, 
but the Brotherhood continued to resist calls for internal reforms, transparency, pluralism, and participation, 
marginalising progressive members’ voices further. Albeit counterintuitive, it was the 2013 repression that 
provided disillusioned members, women included, with greater opportunities to play roles previously denied 
to them in the Brotherhood. The absence of men, incarcerated or otherwise hit by state repression, along with 
the fragmentation of the Brotherhood’s organisation, opened up new spaces for members to play new roles 
and act as agents of political change (Ardovini 2020). Women also seized these spaces, expanding their 
decision-making powers and leadership roles to new areas. After 2013, young Sisters established all-women 
opposition movements, thus emerging as key actors of street protests, and advanced an agenda in partial 
autonomy from the Brotherhood (Biagini 2017). Their activism challenged Brotherhood principles such as 
loyalty and obedience to the leaders, and norms of femininity such as piety and modesty (Biagini 2020b).  
The Brotherhood initially condoned women’s activism because it showcased support for Islamists amid 
growing popular opposition against the movement (Ibid). However, the Brotherhood soon withdrew its 
backing to the women activists. Increasing regime violence against women caused hundreds of them to fall 
under arrest and to be subjected to disappearances, following which the Brotherhood demanded the Sisters to 
abandon the streets as a protection measure.2 Furthermore, repression heightened divisions within the 
 








movement. The brutality of regime violence had caused revolutionary ideas to gain popularity among 
Brotherhood factions. Some among the young Sisters also began to support the use of targeted violence 
against the state as a form of retribution.3 Soon, the rifts that emerged in the streets propagated at the level of 
the movement’s higher leadership. For the first time in decades, the Brotherhood was deeply divided and 
risked internal radicalisation (Willy 2021). Therefore, by late 2015, senior Brotherhood leaders returned to a 
traditional self-restraint approach to repression to minimise the damages to the movement, maintain unity, 
and to regain control of the members. 
To support this effort, the Brotherhood demanded women to return to their traditional role in the family, 
sustain its networks, bring up new generations of members, and conduct ancillary activities in support of the 
movement, the prisoners and their relatives. The Brotherhood saw this role of women as necessary to its 
cohesion and survival. As one Sister stated referring to the expectations that the movement had of women, 
“women are not supposed to weaken their husbands or the movement when they fall under arrest.”4 
Undeniably, under repression, the auxiliary roles that women play in the Brotherhood are even more 
important to ensure the movement’s survival (see Hamdan 2019). Indeed, several Sisters willingly focused 
their efforts back into the family, knowing how vital this was for the movement. As one Sister remarked, 
women were the ones who “allowed the Brotherhood to regain power during Sadat”, and those Sisters who 
gave up street politics to dedicate themselves “to the families of the martyrs and of the injured, taking care of 
their kids and making sure that they get emotional assistance” were ensuring the Brotherhood’s survival 
under al-Sisi.5  
The Sisters took other initiatives to retain some of the autonomy they had gained during the intense period 
of Islamist mobilisation. These took place in alternative spaces and addressed areas upon which women still 
retained some control. One of these initiatives saw the Sisters revisiting the Brotherhood’s tarbiyya curricula 
for women. The repression had caused the fragmentation of the Brotherhood’s organisation, making the 
movement unable to draft members’ educational curricula centrally, thus presenting women with the 
opportunity to draft their own. In the Cairo district where many of my interviewees were active, the Sisters 
revised the tarbiyya curricula that women used in their weekly usra meetings. They did so by reintroducing 
Hassan Al-Banna’s writings in the curricula in their integral form. As the Sister coordinator of this district 
stated, in the decades leading up to 2013, conservative and Salafi-leaning Brotherhood members imbued the 
movement of Wahhabi6 doctrines and ideology that contradicted the moderate Islam that Al-Banna sought to 
promote. They “picked and chose” extracts from Al-Banna’s writings to suit their objectives and their 
conservative and exclusionary rules. Returning to Al-Banna’s texts, in their original and integral form, was 
therefore important to “purify” the Brotherhood from strictly conservative and narrow Islamic 
interpretations. It was also important to retain the younger generations to the movement, who held more 
progressive Islamic interpretations with regard to women in Islam and their role in the movement and 
society.7 This view was shared by young Sisters advocating for greater emancipation for women in the 
movement. As one of them stated, many Brotherhood leaders “have more conservative ideas about women 
because they spent a long time in Saudi Arabia and other countries where Wahhabi Islam is prominent. They 
 
3 Nour, interview, 2017; Alya and Sarah, interviews, 2018. 
4 Reem, interview, 2018. 
5 Nour, interview, 2014. 
6 Wahhabism is a puritanical form of Islam prevalent in Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf countries, considered to be the most 
conservative. Wahhabism permeated the Brotherhood in the 1960s and 1970s, after the return of Brotherhood members to 
Egypt who went in exile in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to escape Gamal Abdul Nasser’s repression. See Tammam (2011). 








think that as a woman you must limit yourself, that there are only limited works you can do and limited roles 
you can play”.8 The Sisters’ endeavour to revise the educational curricula for women emphasises their desire 
to implement a more moderate gender approach in the movement, which could guarantee the Sisters greater 
roles, personal choice and freedom.  
Paralleling a trend observed by other scholars (Ardovini 2020; Matthies-Boon 2017; Allam 2018), under 
authoritarian strengthening, women activists focused on their personal lives to make sense of their past 
experiences and endured sacrifices. In particular, the Sisters concentrated on pursuing personal development 
and professional skills, often building up on roles played and skills gained during the time of mobilisation. 
Some enrolled back in higher education, choosing subjects such as literature and political science, rather than 
religious studies and education, where the Brotherhood used to channel women. Some sought professional 
training in the fields of media and journalism, human resources and psychology, building up on the roles 
they had played as activists in the uprisings and the repression of Islamists. The pursuing of personal 
development by women signalled both their desire to acquire skills denied to them under the Brotherhood 
and to regain a sense of self-worth after other venues for participation were foreclosed to them.  
In the last years of fieldwork, the Sisters began to advance a critique to the Brotherhood’s traditional 
division of labour. As a middle-generation Sister remarked, women had suffered disproportionally under 
repression “because they [the Brotherhood] pushed them continuously in the house and made them unable to 
look after themselves”.9 Indeed, the Brotherhood “looked at women who are ambitious and want to achieve a 
high personal status and at their objectives with great suspicion and doubt”.10 Among young Sisters, 
sentences such as “women are subjected to many forms of discrimination starting from within their houses 
and families”,11 and “women are grown up in the belief that we need to worship male members, beginning 
with our father, then our brother, our uncle, and then our husband and male children”12 abounded. At times, 
the Sisters interpreted the Brotherhood’s patriarchal culture as a movement’s tool to erase their identities and 
individualities. As a young Sister remarked, “Women are considered maids first, then wives, mothers and 
sisters. Their individuality, their desires of what means to be a woman outside these roles is not even 
considered”.13  
Women’s effort to pursue their ambitions, desires and aspirations during the period of Islamists’ 
demobilisation, challenged the Brotherhood’s traditional approach to resist repression. It implied a move 
away of women from the family sphere and from the movement as the recipients of their attention, 
redirecting women’s focus on themselves, their demands and desires. Women’s focusing on activities outside 
the family also compromised the Brotherhood’s gendered division of labour that sustained the movement. 
The movement, along with women’s husbands, put pressure on the Sisters when it believed that women’s 
aspirations compromised the movement’s goals and their families. Some of the Sisters who pursued 
education or work outside the home, for instance, recounted being asked monetary compensation from their 
husbands, on the basis that their wives were “not fulfilling those duties that come upon them from the 
marriage, and according to which the husband pays for, by providing for the family”.14 At times, husbands 
sought the help of senior Brotherhood leaders to pressure women to abandon initiatives aimed at gaining 
 
8 Hessa, interview, 2017. 
9 Reem, interview, 2018. 
10 Menna, interview, 2018. 
11 Lamia, interview, 2018. 
12 Reem, interview, 2018. 
13 Lamia, interview, 2018. 








professional skills, education and a paid job.15 Both the husbands and the movement believed that women’s 
increased autonomy, including economic autonomy, made them less reliant on their husbands, and thus 
facilitated women’s decision to rescind from their family obligations or refuse their husbands’ orders.16  
 
6. Sisters’ Demand for Love  
 
Scholars working on love in Arab societies show that concerns such as personal status and alliances, other 
than love, often dictate individuals’ choices when selecting their marriage partners (Fortier, Kreil and Muffi 
2016). Traditionally, also Brotherhood marriages take place following arrangements between the members of 
the movement. The coordinators of Brotherhood’s and Sisterhood’s families are often the one proposing 
potential partners, or are consulted in the process. These arrangements serve to guarantee the establishment 
of families were both partners are committed to the movement and its goals (Kandil 2015; Menshawy 2020), 
and where a life dedicated to high-risk activism, and often the need to maintain this secret, does not create 
frictions in the relationship. Women are trained since an early age to become model Brotherhood’s wives. 
They are taught to be faithful, obedient and supportive of their husbands, even in situations of disagreements, 
to ensure harmony within the family,17 and to be able to bear situations of difficulty, such as when their 
husbands are arrested, for instance.18 This means that love within marriage only acquires second place in the 
Brotherhood, after members’ commitment to the movement. Indeed, in the Brotherhood, love between 
couples is something that the movement believes to grow with time and not the main reason for two people 
to marry.19 Furthermore, the Brotherhood “exercises pressure on couples to remain together and work out 
personal differences” even in unhappy marriages, because divorce is believed to be against religion’s dictates 
and to damage the movement’s unity, along with the fabric of society.20 
The circumstances of repression, along with the pressures that the Sisters were subjected to by their 
husbands and movement to return to their traditional family role, caused some of them to advance a critique 
of the Brotherhood’s patriarchal family and to reassess their marriage relationship. Love figured prominently 
in women’s discussions. In particular, the Sisters criticised the authority that husbands attributed to 
themselves to rule over their wives and to demand their love, care and obedience, based on men being the 
main providers of women and the family. In contrast, the Sisters imagined a marriage relationship 
characterised by greater power-sharing, where their husbands also loved them, and attended to their needs 
and desires because of love. As this young Sister stated: 
 
In Islam, men should provide for the family, it’s their role, but they use this role to exercise power 
over women. [Men] believe that just because they pay, they can buy your support, love, time and 
everything, that they can own you and control you ... [But] money doesn’t buy more assets in the 
relationship of marriage … If you are not here for the love and respect and because you want to 
share this journey together, then you lose me. If you are not able to convince me that you are 
worth keeping in my life, women who have the means will buy themselves off.21  
 
15 Lamia, interview, 2018. 
16 Reem, interview, 2018. 
17 Nour, interview, 2014. 
18 Reem, interview, 2018. 
19 Lamia, interview, 2018 
20 Farida, interview, 2018. 









Herein, the Sister gives love and care the meaning of a gift, something extra that women bring to the 
relationship of marriage. Giving a gift creates the expectation to be reciprocated by those who receive it, 
although for reciprocation to take place, the receiver must also understand love to be a gift (Hochschild 
1982). The Sister also believes that the love that women give cannot be reciprocated (or bought) by their 
husbands with the money that they spend on the family, because a man’s spending on the family is a 
husband’s religious duty, and therefore it does not bring anything extra to relationship of marriage, and 
cannot be used to reciprocate a gift. Rather, in the Sister’s words, her demand of love from her husband 
indicates her expectation for her husband to reciprocate the gift with equal acts of love, care and respect. The 
relationship the Sister envisions is therefore one where love is mutual and it is part of both the husband’s and 
the wife’s actions within the relationship. This makes marriage a relationship characterised by greater power-
sharing, where both partners take decisions in the relationship (Thagaard 1997).  
Differently from other studies (see Thagaard 1997), I use power-sharing rather than equality to emphasise 
that the goal the Sisters aspire to in marriage when demanding their husband’s love is not to rescind from 
traditional gender roles in the family, but to increase women’s rights in marriage, so to balance these with the 
rights that men enjoy. In particular, what the Sister demanded was her right to have an identity of her own, to 
pursue her interests and to be her own self outside being a mother and a wife. As she continued:  
 
What he [the husband] pays for is the time that the wife invests in the house, in the upbringing of 
children, in looking after him and his needs and the house chores. As a wife, my product is the 
time that I spend in the house and keeps it running. But I am still a human being like he is, I have 
my own journey too, my own desires, my own objectives and my own material and financial 
means! ... When we marry we need to compromise ... men’s duty is to fund the time that I spend 
at home, my own time. However, in Islam, if a man has extra money he disposes of it as it pleases 
him, I have no right to interfere in how he spends it, as far as he covers the basics expenses in the 
house. So, the same should be for me, once I have fulfilled my role [at home] you don’t have the 
right to control what I do with the rest of my time, or prevent me from pursuing my objectives.22  
 
The Sister’s articulation of a marriage relationship characterised by greater power-sharing and freedom, 
went hand in hand with her reimagining marriage as a loving relationship. In the Sister’s view, a loving 
husband was essential for her to be herslef outside being a mother and a wife, to cultivate her desires, 
ambitions and autonomy. Ozyegin (2015) makes a similar observation in her study of upwardly mobile 
young Muslim women in Turkey. She found that those who aspired to pursue a career and to retain their 
personal interests after marriage sought a “marriage of compatibility” as opposed to a “marriage of logic”. In 
these women’s view, a “marriage of compatibility” was one established on an ethics of mutual care between 
husbands and wives, whereas interests other than mutual love dominated a “marriage of logic”. Love was 
central to a “marriage of compatibility” because only a man who loves his wife would be able to recognise a 
woman’s value. Therefore, in a “marriage of compatibility”, women searched for “the emotional contribution 
of a man to a woman’s growth ... realised through the medium of love. His love spoils her, bolster her 
confidence, incites her growth, and supports her in pursuing desires and needs of her own” (214). The Sisters 
in this study share many characteristics with the women Ozyegin interviewed. Most are in their 20s and 30s, 
pursuing education, professionalism and skills that they wish to place at the service of society and the 










the roles they played in the resistance of Islamists since 2013, consequently to which they acquired greater 
awareness of their value as women and as members of society outside that of being wives and mothers.  
Because gender is a relational category, imagining new masculinities was essential for women to inhabit 
the identities they had created for themselves (Oziegyn 2015, 225). Making their husbands love them and 
understand their value as women, outside that of being wives and mothers, was indeed important for the 
Sisters to be the women they wished to be, their own selves. Importantly, their husbands had to be able to 
love them unconditionally, and support them regardless of whether the aspirations they pursued transgressed 
feminine notions and roles that the Brotherhood ascribed to women, as the words of this Sister suggests:  
 
As a mother you provide because of love, not because you have to or because you expect your kids 
to behave a certain way. What do you do if your kid is sick and needs help, but he just misbehaved 
before? Don’t you take him to the doctor? You do, because it’s your kid and you love him. The 
same should be between husband and wife. Husbands should not use guardianship to blackmail 
their wives. They should provide and look after the family because they are in love.23  
 
Herein, the Sister is imagining marriage as a loving relationship, in which her husband fulfils his duties 
towards the family out of love, attending to her needs even if she “misbehaved” or disobeyed his wishes, as 
the example of the child the Sister makes suggests. In this loving relationship, the husband’s primary role as 
provider of the family does not exonerate him from the duty to care for and love his wife. Rather, it demands 
the husband to love her, whether she complies with her husband’s expectations in marriage or not.  
As the Sisters’ articulations suggest, women’s demand for love from their husbands reveal their desire to 
establish marriage relationships where husbands are equally invested in attending to women’s needs, desires 
and aspirations, even when these contravene traditional gender roles and notions of femininity, so that 
women can be selves with identities of their choosing, other than uniquely mothers and wives. Women’s 
demand for love in the family sphere has implications for the Brotherhood as a movement for the very nature 
of gender being a relational category. Women’s demands for their husbands to commit to their needs cannot 
be accomplished without a change in the heterosexual and patriarchal character of the ideology that governs 
the Brotherhood’s family, its notions of masculinity and femininity that inform its collective identity, and the 
division of labour over which the organisation stands. As such, women’s demand for love from their 
husbands also extends to the Brotherhood and implies a shift in the Brotherhoods’ commitment to attend to 
women’s needs, desires and aspirations.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Women’s activism is central to the Brotherhood’s ability to sustain itself under repression and its absence. 
Starting within the family, women undertake the largest share of work that is necessary to the movement’s 
organic and ideological (re)production. This frees men from the responsibility of reproductive work, giving 
them the opportunity to practice politics and risk repression. The Brotherhood’s heterosexual and patriarchal 
ideology normalises this women’s work as free and moralises it as women’s outmost expression of love. It 
also equates women’s family role, their abidance to motherhood and to a normative model of selfless 
femininity, to women’s commitment to the movement. This arrangement comes at the expenses of women’s 
autonomy and of their ability to pursue needs, desires and aspirations that contravene the Brotherhood’s 
gender regime, goals and mission.  
 








These gendered arrangements have grown increasingly challenged by a young generation of Sisterhood 
activists since the 2013 repression of Islamists, and were further nurtured by the Brotherhood’s efforts to 
channel women back into the family sphere after a period of women’s expanded freedom and autonomy. In 
the current period of authoritarian strengthening, all other opportunities for political participation being 
foreclosed to them, women have focused on their personal lives to bring forward the gender reforms they 
advanced and hoped for since Egypt’s uprisings, and to give meaning to their endured sacrifices. This 
women’s new entrepreneurial spirit challenges the Brotherhood’s ability to sustain itself under repression 
because it implies a shift away of women from the family and the movement as the primary units of their 
attention.  
Under the Brotherhood’s pressure to comply with their traditional family role, women have advanced 
demands for love from their husbands in marriage relationships. As the article’s analysis puts forward, 
women’s demand for love from their husbands reveal their desire to establish greater power-sharing in 
marriage, and make their husbands equally invested in attending women’s needs, desires and aspirations, 
even when these contravene traditional gender roles and notions of femininity. Women see obtaining their 
husbands’ love as necessary to inhabit identities they have created for themselves outside that of being 
mothers and wives. Women’s demand for love in marriage has implications for the Brotherhood as a 
movement for the very nature of gender being a relational category. Women’s demands for their husbands to 
commit to their needs cannot be accomplished without a change in the heterosexual and patriarchal character 
of the ideology that governs the Brotherhood’s family, its notions of masculinity and femininity that inform 
its collective identity, and the division of labour over which the organization stands. As such, women’s 
demand for love from their husbands extends to the Brotherhood and implies a shift in the Brotherhoods’ 
commitment to attend to women’s needs, desires and aspirations. Consequently, women’s activism within 
the family sphere is yet another internal challenge the Brotherhood has to deal with in the aftermath of the 
2013 repression, and one that has the potential to compromise the Brotherhood’s ability to re-emerge from 
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